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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 13,1994, a double murder in Southern California 2 created more than
a year's worth of sensational headlines and put the problem of domestic
violence in the national spotlight. The bodies of Nicole Brown Simpson and
Ronald Goldman were found stabbed to death outside Simpson's
condominium. Several days later, police arrested Nicole Brown Simpson's
ex-husband, football star O.J. Simpson, and charged him in the double murder.3
Almost immediately, the media revealed Simpson's history as an abusive
1The author thanks Professor S. Candice Hoke for her assistance in this project.
2 Eric Malnic & Josh Meyer, O.J. Simpson's Ex-Wife, Man Found Slain, L.A. TIMES, June
14, 1994, at Cl.
3Jim Newton & Shawn Hubler, Simpson Held After Wild Chase, He's Charged With
Murder of Ex-Wife, Friend, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1994, at Al.
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husband.4 Recordings of a fearful Nicole Brown Simpson telephoning the
emergency 9-1-1 center, relating her distress over an impending attack by her
ex-husband, were broadcast across the world. Prosecutors used this history of
domestic violence to paint Simpson as a jealous and obsessive former husband
who killed the pair in a fit of rage. Although a jury eventually acquitted
Simpson of the murder charges,5 the effects of this nationwide focus on
domestic abuse remain.
About two months after the Simpson murders and after four years of
debate, 6 Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act 7 [hereinafter the
VAWA or the Act] as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 19948 [hereinafter 1994 Crime Bill]. Critics immediately hailed this new
domestic violence legislation as a politically motivated response to recent
widespread publicity surrounding domestic violence.9 Although little doubt
exists that this country needs to reduce domestic violence, this sweeping
federal legislation may not be the most effective means.
While the policy debate continues to be waged over the legislative wisdom
in enacting the VAWA, a legal controversy over its constitutionality is being
faced in federal district courts. Solely because Congress exceeded its authority
under the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez 10
invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,11 a federal statute banning
the possession of firearms on or near school property. Noting this "dramatic
shift in its approach to constitutional federalism,"12 commentators
immediately began speculating that other federal laws, including the VAWA,
4 Josh Meyer, Police Records Detail 1989 Beating That Led To Charge Violence, L.A. TIMES,
June 17, 1994, at A24.
5 Jim Newton, Simpson Not Guilty; Drama Ends 474 Days After Arrest, L.A. TIMEs, Oct.
4, 1995, at Al.
6 The Violence Against Women Act was first introduced in the 101st Congress as S.
2754 in the Senate and as H.R. 5168 in the House. Three hearings were held during 1990
in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary featuring testimony of law enforcement
officials, university professors and operators of rape crisis centers and battered womens'
shelters. This testimony addressed the problem of violence against women and the need
for federal legislation to combat it. See H.R. Rep. No. 395, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. 26-28
(1993).
7 The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, secs. 4001-40703
(codified in 108 Stat. 1902-55 and various sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
8 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. (now codified in various sections of the United States Code).
9 See Patricia Edmonds & Linda Kanamine, Messages Mixed on Domestic Violence,
USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 1995, at 2A.
10115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
1118 U.S.C.A. § 922(q)(1)(A)(West 1995).
12 Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1789 (June 1995).
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would be invalidated as a result of this decision.13 As discussion continues over
the overall effects of Lopez, federal courts have already shown a willingness to
use the decision in finding that Congress has exceeded its powers in enacting
other federal legislation.
Although the VAWA withstood its first federal court challenge, 14 a portion
of the legislation was found unconstitutional just weeks later by another federal
district court.15 This Note argues that portions of the Violence Against Women
Act will continue to be struck down on Commerce Clause grounds.
Furthermore, domestic relations and domestic violence are areas of the law that
have traditionally been most effectively regulated by the States. While the
problem of domestic violence in our nation is indeed significant, the new
federal legislation is unlikely to provide viable solutions. Perhaps the only
portions of the Act passing constitutional muster are those provisions which
provide money to the States to assist in their efforts aimed at domestic violence
prevention and prosecution. Whereas this Note reasons that the Commerce
Clause power does not extend so far as to authorize the VAWA, it also
recognizes that the States are capable of actively pursuing solutions to our
nation's domestic violence problem.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Domestic violence has been called the "leading cause of injury to American
women," 16 resulting in approximately 1,400 deaths per year.17 In 1992, the
American Medical Association declared domestic violence against women a
national epidemic requiring a response from health officials and suggested that
doctors routinely screen female patients for signs of abuse. 18 Lawmakers
studying the VAWA found that thirty-five percent of hospital emergency room
visits by women are due to domestic violence.1 9 Recent Justice Department
statistics show that females experience ten times as many attacks at the hands
of an intimate associate than do males. 20 Among women who experienced
131d.
14 Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996), to be discussed infra throughout this
Note.
15 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996),
to be discussed infra throughout this Note.
16 See New State and Federal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1528,
1546 (1993) (citing Antonia C. Novello, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health
Service, 267 JAMA 3132 (1992)).
17Margaret Carlson, Preventable Murders, TIME, Oct. 16, 1995, at 64.
18Jill Smolowe, What The Doctor Should Do. (American Medical Association Creates
Guidelines For Dealing With Domestic Violence), TIME, June 29, 1992, at 57.
19H. R. Rep. No. 395, supra note 6, at 26.
20U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pub. No. NCJ-145325, Violence Against Women: A National
Crime Victimization Survey Report (1994). On average, women experienced 572,032
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attack, injuries occur almost twice as frequently when the offender was an
intimate associate than when the perpetrator was a stranger.21
Although domestic violence was increasingly being recognized as a serious
problem before the Simpson and Goldman murders, the case provided the
impetus to push the issue to the national forefront and to prompt thousands of
women to seek help. In Los Angeles County, felony abuse cases rose from 970
in 1991 to 2,154 in 1994.22 According to the National Center for State Courts,
thirty percent of women who filed civil orders against their batterers were
influenced by the Simpson case.23 Even after the October 1995 verdict, calls to
domestic violence shelters remained high. An Oregon crisis line reports that
calls tripled on the day of the verdict and have remained consistently high.24
While stringent laws are vital, enforcement of such measures is essential to
alleviate this national problem. Lawmakers studying the VAWA admit that
"our legal system has historically failed to address violence against women
with appropriate seriousness.' 2 5 Many observers claim that judges do not take
domestic violence cases seriously26 and that batterers are often quickly released
from overcrowded jails.27 Whether federal legislation willbe any more effective
or desirable than current state law 28 in quelling public outcry to stop domestic
abuse remains debatable.
A. The Violence Against Women Act
A House Report on the VAWA states that the legislation is 'based on a
recognition that law enforcement efforts against domestic violence and rape
have been insufficient."29 The multi-faceted Act provides, for the first time, a
violent attacks by intimates, compared to 48,983 incidents reported by men. Id.
2 1 Id.
22 Ted Gest & Betsy Streisand, Still Failing Women? The Justice System Hasn't Improved
Much in Fighting Domestic Violence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD R'r., June 19, 1995, at 54.
231d.
24 Chastity Pratt, Aid Calls Rise in Wake of Simpson Acquittal, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Oct. 16, 1995, at B1.
25 H.R. Rep. No. 395, supra note 6, at 27.
26 Gest & Streisand, supra note 22. The article mentions a California judge who
suggested that Nicole Azzalina drop charges against a former boyfriend who had
repeatedly beat her. She was killed three weeks later. This case is included in a training
course for judges on CD-ROM issued by The Family Violence Prevention Fund. Id.
2 7 1d.
28 According to a 1994 Harris Poll, while 56% of those polled answered crime and
violence when asked, "What do you think are the two most serious problems facing the
country?," only 36% offered the same response when asked, "What do you think are the
two most important issues for the government to address?" See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
THE SOURCEBOOK 155 (1993).
29 H.R. Rep. No. 395, supra note 6, at 25.
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federal civil rights remedy aimed at gender-based crime3 0 that would allow a
victim to bring a federal claim for "any act that would be considered a felony,
including rape and spouse abuse, regardless of whether any criminal charges
have been brought."3 1 The Act also criminalizes at the federal level the offense
of crossing state a line to commit an act of domestic violence32 or to violate a
protection order,3 3 but does not extinguish state criminal actions for the same
conduct. The Act also provides $800 million in grants to states, local
governments and Indian tribes to improve law enforcement, prosecution,
education, and victims services in domestic abuse cases, 34 although debate
continued into late 1995 over whether Congress will allocate this funding.35
Proponents of the Act, such as the National Organization for Women, call the
measure "the most comprehensive federal response to this problem that has
ever been attempted."36
3042 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (West 1995). The short title is "Civil Rights Remedies for
Gender-Motivated Violence Act." Subsection (a) says the purpose of the subtitle is "to
protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public
safety, health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil
rights cause of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender." 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 13981 (a) (West 1995).
31 Henry J. Reske, An Untested Remedy For Abused Women, A.B.A.J., Jan. 1995, at 20.
3218 U.S.C.A. § 2261 (West 1995)
(a) A person who travels across a State line or enters or leaves Indian
country with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's
spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the course of or as a result of
such travel, intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby
causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner, shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b). Id.
Penalties include life in prison if death of an offender's spouse results, up to 20 years if
the attack results in "permanent disfigurement" or "life threatening bodily injury," up
to 10 years in prison if an attack results in "serious bodily injury" or a "dangerous
weapon" is used in the attack, or up to five years in any other case. Id.
33 See 18 U.S.C.A § 2262 (West 1995).
3442 U.S.C.A. § 3786 (West 1995), 42 U.S.C.A. § 3793 (West 1995). See also NOW LEGAL
DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, Sept. 1994.
35Responding to President Bill Clinton's veto of the Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1966, Rep.
Susan Molinari of New York said, "I rise today to express my strong disappointment
with President Clinton's veto of this bill. This bill included full finding for the Violence
Against Women Act; $175 million to protect women and children from abuse. That is
an increase of 573 percent from last year." 141 Cong. Rec. H15239-01 (daily ed. Dec. 20,
1995) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
3 6Rorie Sherman, Domestic Abuse Bills Gain Momentum in Legislatures: The Violence
Against Women Act Has Lingered On the Hillfor Four Years, NAT'L L.J., July 4, 1994, at A9,
(quoting Sally Goldfarb, a NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund attorney).
19961
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Despite considerable congressional testimony contending that the
legislation is necessary,37 the VAWA provisions appear to be relatively
untested.38 In a May 1996 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Senator Orrin
Hatch, a supporter of the Act, expressed concern over the small number of
VAWA prosecutions. 39 Attorney General Janet Reno did not respond when
Hatch asked her how many VAWA prosecutions there had been, but Justice
Department figures compiled later that day showed that there had been
fourteen.4 0
The first VAWA conviction occurred on May 23, 1995. A federal jury in
Charleston, West Virginia convicted Christopher Bailey under a criminal
portion of the Act, section 2261, which federalized the offense of crossing a state
line when committing an act of domestic violence. 41 Prosecutors claimed that
Bailey beat his wife then kept her unconscious in his car trunk while he drove
for six days around West Virginia, Kentucky and Ohio.42 In September 1995, a
federal judge sentenced Bailey to the maximum twenty year penalty for
violating section 2261, plus a life sentence for kidnapping. 43 As of late 1995, at
least one other case under 2261 was pending.44
37 The following hearings were held before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
violence against women: Women and Violence (June 20, 1990), Violence Against
Women (Aug. 29, 1990), Domestic Violence (Dec. 11, 1990), Violence Against Women:
Hate Crimes (Apr. 9, 1991), Violence Against Women: A Week in the Life of America
(Feb. 4,1992), Legislative Answers to Stalking (Sept. 29,1992), Violence Against Women,
field hearing held in South Portland, Maine (Nov. 12, 1993), Violent Crimes Against
Women, field hearing held in Salt Lake City, Utah (Apr. 13, 1993), Domestic Violence,
field hearing held in Boston, Mass. (Feb. 1, 1993), Anti-Stalking Proposals: Combatting
Stalking and Family Violence (Mar. 17, 1993), The Response to Rape: Detours on the
Road to Equal Justice (May 27, 1993), Putting the Violence Against Women Act into
Action (Sept. 29, 1994). See Turning The Act Into Action, The Violence Against Women
Law, S. Rep. No. 522-5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1994).
38 The few prosecutions under the VAWA became an issue in the 1996 Presidential
campaign. After President Bill Clinton announced $46 million in grants to help police
across the nation combat domestic violence, his challenger Republican Bob Dole
attacked Clinton for his administration's "appalling record on domestic violence" and
pointed out that the Justice Department had brought only 14 prosecutions under the
Act since its enactment. Clinton Announces Grants, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 21, 1996,
at A2.
39 George Lardner, The Law Stops at the State Line; Ignorance, Confusion Paralyze the
Cops, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 2, 1996, at C3.
Ol d.
4118 U.S.C. § 2261 (West 1995). See West Virginia; Husband Guilty in Beating, NAT'L L.
J., June 5, 1995, at A8.
42ld.
43 Man Convicted Under Domestic Violence Act Given Life Term, Los ANGELES TIMEs,
Sept. 2, 1995, at 4.
44U.S. Attorney Rebecca Betts, the prosecutor in the Bailey case, says a second case
has been filed in California. Maryclaire Dale, Bailey Sentenced to Life in Prison,
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In December 1995, New York prosecutors announced the first apparent
charge under 18 U.S.C. § 2262, 45 the VAWA provision federalizing the crime of
crossing state lines to violate a protective order.46 Wayne Hayes of Columbus,
Ohio is accused of harassing his ex-wife and sending her threatening letters
after she fled to New Jersey with their son.47 In an absurd twist, Hayes is facing
extradition to New York to stand trial on the charges because he reportedly
used New York City's Laguardia Airport to travel to New Jersey to allegedly
harass his former wife.48
The first case under the VAWA civil rights provision was also the first to be
dismissed on Lopez grounds. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ. was
filed in December 1995,49 but was dismissed by a federal judge several months
later.50 Brzonkala involves an alleged rape which occurred on the Virginia Tech
University campus. 51 A former Virginia Tech student, Christy Brzonkala,
claims two football players raped her in their dorm room in September 1994,
approximately one week after the enactment of VAWA. Brzonkala did not file
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 2, 1995, at Al.
4518 U.S.C.A. § 2262. (West 1995).
Interstate violation of protection order
(a) OFFENSES.
(1) CROSSING A STATE LINE.-A person who travels across a
State line or enters or leaves Indian country with the intent to
engage in conduct that-
(A)(i) violates the portion of a protection order that involves pro-
tection against credible threats of violence, repeated harassment,
or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection
order was issued; or
(ii) would violate subparagraph (A) if the conduct occurred in the
jurisdiction in which the order was issued; and
(B) subsequently engages in such conduct, shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b).
Id.
46 Jan Hoffman, Man is First Charged in Spouse Abuse Law, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Dec.
22, 1995, at 6.
4 7 Haye's indictment was announced on December 21, 1995. Id.
4 8 Charged Under Stalking Law, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 8, 1996, at A8. That it has taken more
than year to test this VAWA provision as well as the fact that Hayes is facing the charges
in New York, a state that has a questionable relation to the alleged crime, adds fuel to
the debate over whether all of the facets of the VAWA are necessary or desirable.
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (West 1995). Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State
Univ., No. 95-1358-R (W.D. Va. filed Dec. 27, 1995). The complaint also sought relief
under 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (for violation of plaintiff's civil rights under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (for conspiracy to violate
plaintiff's civil rights).
50 See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., supra note 15.
51Betty Hayden & Jan Vertefeuille, Ex-Student Sues Tech, 2 Players: $8.3 Million
Lawsuit Claims 3 1994 Rapes, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Jan. 3, 1996, at Al.
1996]
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criminal charges against the pair but alternatively relied on the school's internal
sexual assault policy.52
Brzonkala's attorney, Eileen Wagner, called the suit a "test case" under the
VAWA.53 According to the Complaint, the alleged rapes "were motivated
wholly by discriminatory animus" toward plaintiff's gender and "were not
random acts of violence."54 Wagner says that the Virginia Attorney General's
Office and Virginia State Police began an investigation into the alleged rapes
after hearing of the case through media reports.55 In July 1996, District Judge
Jackson L. Kiser dismissed the claims with prejudice and declared the VAWA
civil rights remedy unconstitutional. Kiser concluded that "[a] reasonable
adherence to Lopez reveals that the VAWA is not a proper use of the commerce
power."56
The VAWA civil rights provision is also the first portion of the Act to
withstand a constitutional challenge on Lopez grounds. In Doe v. Doe,57 plaintiff
Jane Doe58 sued her estranged husband under 42 U.S.C. § 13981, seeking
damages for "deprivation of her federal right to be free from her husband's
alleged gender-based violence against her." 59 The plaintiff claims that, from
1978 to 1995, her husband subjected her to "a violent pattern of physical and
mental abuse" that included throwing her to the floor, throwing sharp objects
at her, threatening to kill her and destroying her property.60 The defendant filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint, challenging the constitutionality of the
VAWA civil rights remedy by arguing that Congress, after United States v. Lopez,
521d. One of the alleged offenders was found guilty of sexual assault in a campus
hearing last year and was suspended for two semesters. The other has had no action
taken against him by the campus judicial board.
53 1d. The student is seeking $4 million dollars in damages from the university, as well
as damages for medical and psychological treatment and loss of education. She is
seeking another $4.3 million in damages from the alleged perpetrators.
54 Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., No. 95-1358-R (W.D. Va. Dec.
27,1995)(complaint).
55Telephone Interview with Eileen Wagner, attorney for Christy Brzonkala (Feb. 16,
1996). See also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ., No. 95-1358
(W.D. Va. Dec. 27,1995) (plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion to sever and
motion to extend time for service of complaint).
56 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 793.
57929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
58The court granted plaintiff's Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym. Although the
defendant initially had no objection to this motion, he has since filed an objection to the
case proceeding under fictitious names and has moved to vacate the court's order. Id.
at 610, n. 1.
591d. at 610.
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lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the statute.61 In June
1996, U.S. District Judge Janet Bond Arterton 62 denied the defendant's motion
and concluded that the VAWA "is a proper exercise of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause."63 The defense has apparently filed a motion
asking Arterton to allow the defendant to immediately appeal the decision to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals instead of waiting for the case to be tried.64
This Note agrees that the VAWA civil rights provision, 42 U.S.C. section
13981,65 as well as 18 U.S.C. § 261, which elevates an act of domestic violence
to a federal criminal offense if the perpetrator crosses a state line, are the VAWA
provisions most susceptible to further challenge. Not only is it arguable that
domestic violence has no substantial relation to interstate commerce, but the
Act also infringes on areas of law traditionally left to the states: crime and
domestic relations. These areas are specifically mentioned in Lopez as among
those best left in the local arena.
The civil rights provision is especially ripe for further challenge because the
provision has a specific statutory tie to the Commerce Clause, based on
pre-Lopez interpretation. 66 Controversial since its inception, the U.S. Judicial
Conference initially opposed the measure, fearing that it would be used as a
'bargaining chip in divorces."67 The Doe case arguably reinforces those fears.
The Conference also expressed concern that the new law would flood the
federal courts with new cases. Noting that in 1989 three million domestic
relations cases were filed in state courts, the Conference anticipated that if
one-tenth of those cases ended up on the federal courts, they alone "would
61Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610.
62 Commentators have noted that the first two VAWA court rulings have split along
gender lines. See David E. Rovella, He Rules. She Rules on Violence Law, NAT'L L. J., Aug.
12, 1996, at A8.
63 Mark Pazniokas, Civil Rights of Women Upheld at Heart of Case Involving Spousal
Abuse, THE HARTFORD COURANT, June 20,1996, at A3. Judge Arterton disagreed with the
defendant's argument that Lopez overruled the rational basis test for determining
whether federal legislation can withstand a Commerce Clause challenge. This Note
disagrees with the judge's conclusion and argues that Lopez requires that federal
legislation substantially affect interstate commerce to withstand a Commerce Clause
challenge. See discussion infra pp. 21-25.
64 Id.
65 While this Note argues that portions of the VAWA should be invalidated because
the Act exceeds Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause, it should be noted
that there is speculation that the civil rights provision of the Act could also be found
unconstitutional under the test set forth in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993),
that determines the constitutionality of so-called "thought crimes" statutes.
66 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(a) (West 1995). Pursuant to the affirmative power of
Congress to enact this subtitle under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution.
67 Henry J. Reske, An Untested Remedy for Abused Women, 81 Jan. A.B.A.J. 20 (1995).
1996]
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exceed all cases now pending in federal district and appeals courts."68 In March
1993 the Judicial Conference changed its position on the bill to "no position,"
but continued to express its concern about the trend toward the "federalization
of state law crimes and causes of action."69
B. The Chief Justice's Opposition to VAWA
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who wrote for the majority in Lopez, has
long been outspoken about how the federalization of criminal law will affect
the federal courts. Traditionally, the enforcement of criminal law has been a
matter for state and local governments. In recent years, however, our country
has seen a significant expansion of federal authority over crimes that were
formerly under the realm of the states. 70 Drug and weapons offenses are two
prime examples of recently federalized crimes. There are now close to 3,000
federal crimes on the books, many of them sharing jurisdiction with nearly
identical state crimes.7 1 Critics of this federalization claim that this "creeping
and foolish federal overcriminalization" is the result of congressional reaction
to media coverage of dramatic crimes which produces what may be perceived
as "widespread public anxiety."72
The Chief Justice's criticism undoubtedly increases the likelihood that the
Supreme Court would invalidate portions of the VAWA upon a Commerce
Clause challenge. In his 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary,73 the
Chief Justice, urging Congress to be cautious in creating new federal causes of
action, singled out precisely those portions of the VAWA (then S. 1574) that this
Note claims should be invalidated, the criminal provision and the civil rights
remedy. Rehnquist pointed out that,
[a]lthough supporting the underlying objectives of S.15 - to deter
violence against women - the Judicial Conference opposes some
68 1d. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del) responded to the statement by saying that the Act
"would not involve the federal courts in domestic relations cases." Id.
69ld.
70 See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995).
71See Michelle W. Easterling, For Better Or Worse: The Federalization of Domestic
Violence, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 944 (1996).
72 Sanford H. Kadish, Comment, The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247,
1248 (1995). Kadish contends that the two primary problems with overfederalization of
criminal law are the fact that it tends to allow Congress to duplicate state law whenever
it chooses and that this results in a "wasteful duplication of resources where federal
resources are desperately needed for other functions." Id. at 1249.
73 Hon. William H. Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, reprinted
in THE THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1992 at 1.
Rehnquist says "[m]odest curtailment of federal jurisdiction is important; equally
important is self-restraint in adding new federal causes of action." Id. at 3.
74S. 15 is essentially the same a the measure passed in 1994.
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portions of the bill. The broad definition of criminal conduct is so
open-ended, and the new private right of action so sweeping, that the
legislation could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic
relations disputes.
75
Furthermore, Rehnquist warns that additional federal law should not be
considered "unless critical to meeting important national interests" which
cannot be solved through alternate means, including the state courts. 76
Obviously, the Chief Justice, while agreeing that domestic violence is a serious
problem, disagrees with Congress that this is an area which requires federal
intervention.
In subsequent reports, Rehnquist has reiterated the federal judiciary's
concern regarding enlarging the jurisdiction of federal courts to encompass
areas traditionally reserved to the states. In his 1994 Year-End Report,7 7
Rehnquist says,
[t]here is considerable sentiment in the federal judiciary at the present
time against further expansion of federal jurisdiction into areas which
have been previously the province of state courts enforcing state laws.
Part of this stems from a genuine concern about the erosion of
federalism, and the traditional division of responsibility between
federal courts and state courts.
78
Rehnquist concedes that Congress is the "ultimate arbiter" of questions
regarding matters of federal versus state control, but adds that the future shape
of the federal courts is "surely a legitimate subject for judicial input to
Congress."79
C. Opposition by Other Segments of the Legal Community
Like their federal counterparts, state judges have also criticized portions of
the VAWA. In 1991, the Conference of State Judges, made up of state court
leaders, sent letters to members of the Senate Judiciary Committee who were
then considering passage of the VAWA. The state judges also told committee
members that they fear that the civil rights measure would add a count to
"nearly every divorce and domestic violence case. '80 In his statement before
75Id. at 3.
7 6 Id.
77Hon. William H. Rehnquist, 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, reprinted
in THE THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1995, at 1.
781d. at 3. This Note agrees with those constitutional scholars who feel that the Lopez
decision is a reflection of Rehnquist's frustration over his unheeded warnings to
Congress regarding increasing federal jurisdiction, as well as his concern over this
so-called erosion of federalism.
79 Id. at 4.
80 Rorie Sherman, Federal Suits Allowed: Fears Expressed on Proposed Bill To Aid Women,
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the Senate Judiciary Committee, the President of the Conference of Chief
Justices told lawmakers that the provision could have a significant impact on
domestic relations cases because "it can be anticipated that this right will be
invoked as a bargaining tool within the context of divorce negotiations and add
a major complicating factor to an environment which is often acrimonious as
it is. "81
State supreme court justices say another problem with the civil rights remedy
is that it allows concurrent jurisdiction.82 Thus, under this provision, a
perpetrator could face both a federal and a state charge in connection with the
same incident. The state judges fear this will "cause major state-federal
jurisdictional problems and disruptions in the processing of domestic relations
cases in state courts. ' '83
Significantly, members of the U.S. Justice Department who would be
prosecuting those charged with VAWA offenses, also sent letters to the Senate
Judiciary Committee expressing their opposition to the legislation. 84 The
federal prosecutors told lawmakers that the VAWA would complicate divorce
and domestic violence cases and argued that the bill was unnecessary because
the states are already devising methods to combat domestic violence.85 Since
its passage, however, federal prosecutors have been forced to defend the Act
upon challenge. Members of the U.S. Justice Department, in fact, assisted Jane
Doe's attorney in defending the constitutionality of the VAWA civil rights
remedy in Doe v. Doe.86
In 1992, delegates to the American Bar Association convention expressed
concern over the then-pending VAWA.87 Federal Judge Norman L. Shapiro of
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania told the group that the Act would heavily
increase the workload of the federal courts.88 Criminal attorneys told attendees
that the Act would federalize a number of crimes now handled by the states,
adding that no proof exists that state prosecutors have been "inadequate in pro-
NAT'L L. J., June 3, 1991, at 3.
81 Violence Motivated by Gender: Statement on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1stSess. (1993) (statement of Hon. VincentL. McKusick, President,
Conference of Chief Justices).
8242 U.S.C.A. § 13981(3) (West 1995). The federal and state courts shall have
concurrent jurisdiction over actions brought pursuant to this subtitle.
83 See supra note 81.
84 Id.; see infra pp. 30-33.
851d.
86 Pazniokas, supra note 63.
87 News in Brief, U.S.L.WK., Aug. 18, 1992.
881d.
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secuting such offenses.' 89 Other attendees expressed concern that the Act
creates serious problems regarding federalism and statutory interpretation. 90
Even though members of the legal community recognize the potential
problems associated with VAWA, a number of influential groups spoke out in
favor of the Act, unaware of its potential constitutional flaws. 91 Furthermore,
a group of non-profit organizations "representing and advocating on behalf of
women who have survived gender-motivated violence" were allowed to
appear as amicus curiae in Doe.92 Commentators suggest that interest groups
prefer federal legislation over state law for several reasons which the VAWA
validates. First, passing one federal provision is less expensive than obtaining
the passage of fifty state statutes. Federalization can increase attention to an
issue like domestic abuse. Federal law is "often considered a higher quality
product than state law" and some feel federal law is harder to avoid than state
law.93 While these arguments may bear true, they do not overcome
well-established policy reasons demanding that domestic violence remain
under the control of the states.
III. THE NEW COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE TO FEDERAL LEGISLATION
On April 26, 1995, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark
decision resulting in the rejuvenation of the Commerce Clause debate
jeopardizing portions of the VAWA, as well as other federal laws. For the first
time since 1936,94 the Court invalidated a federal law under the Commerce
Clause. While the longterm impact of the case remains unclear, federal courts
have already used the case to challenge several federal laws.
89 Id.
90Id. Proponents of VAWA argued that moving to go on record against the bill would
make it appear as if the ABA were "hostile" to legislation designed to protect women.
The ABA delegates, thus, by a hand vote, decided not to put itself on record against
VAWA. Id. In August, 1995, the ABA's first women president, Roberta Cooper Ramo,
announced at the group's annual meeting that "ensuring adequate funding for the
Violence Against Women Act" is among her goals. See Karen Donovon, American Bar
Association 1st Woman President Sets Out Her Agenda, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at A5.
9 1See S. Rep. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
92 Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610. The group includes representatives of the NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund, National Organization for Women Foundation, The
Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund, Inc., National Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, and the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence. Id. at
*1, n.2.
9 3 Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference To Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv. 265, 271-73
(1990).
94 1n Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court held that Congress had
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Bituminous Coal Act
of 1935.
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A. United States v. Lopez
In United States v. Lopez,95 voting five to four,96 the Court concluded that the
Gun-Free School Zone Act of 199097 exceeded Congress' authority under the
Commerce Clause. The Court essentially rejected the statute because the
activity in question did not "substantially effect" interstate commerce.98 The
Court reasoned that the statute lacked a jurisdictional element99 or legislative
history that tied it to interstate commerce. 1° The Court further criticized the
statute by pointing out that the measure intrudes on areas of law, education
and crime, traditionally under state control.101 Though all of these factors led
to the decision, apparently the foremost requirement under Lopez is that an
activity must substantially affect interstate commerce before Congress can
intervene.
This new test for determining Congress' Commerce Clause power is
designed to halt the movement toward unlimited federal power. Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist expressed concern regarding
unbridled federal authority and intrusion into areas of law traditionally
reserved to the states, saying that to side with the federal government, "[w]e
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convet congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States."
102
Alfonzo Lopez is described by one scholar as an "unlikely candidate to be a
federal cause celebre." 103 The twelfth grader was arrested on March 10, 1992
after arriving at his San Antonio, Texas high school carrying a concealed .38
951 15 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
96 Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in the majority opinion. Justice Kennedy filed a
concurring opinion, in which Justice O'Connor joined. Justice Thomas also filed a
concurring opinion. Justices Stevens and Souter filed dissenting opinions. Justice Breyer
also filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens joined.
9718 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1995). The Act made it a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone." Id. School zone is defined as "in, or on the grounds
of, a public, parochial or private school" or "within a distance of 1,000 feet from the
grounds of a public, parochial or private school." § 921 (a)(25).
98 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
99 1d. at 1631.
10 01d. at 1631-32.
101Id. at 1633-34.
102Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
103 Kathleen Brickey, Remarks at Symposium on The New Federalism After U.S. v.
Lopez (Nov. 11, 1995) (videotape available at the Case Western Reserve Law School
library).
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caliber handgun.104 Lopez was initially charged under Texas law, but the next
day federal agents charged him under the Gun-Free School Zones Act.105 After
waiving his right to a jury trial, a district court judge found Lopez guilty of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (q) and sentenced him to six months imprisonment
and two years supervised release. 106 Lopez appealed his conviction, arguing
that the Act "exceeded Congress' power to legislate under the Commerce
Clause."107 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed
Lopez's conviction on the Commerce Clause challenge. 108 The Supreme Court
affirmed, agreeing with the Fifth Circuit that possession of a gun in a local
school zone did not substantially affect interstate commerce. 109
Lopez modifies traditional Commerce Clause analysis in several ways.
Previously, the sole issue in this analysis was whether the regulated activity
affected interstate commerce. The Court in Lopez splits this analysis into several
steps and appears to add "specific protection from regulation for areas of
traditional concern to the states."110 The Court identified three broad categories
of activity that Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause: 1) "the use
of channels of interstate commerce;" 2) "the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities";
and 3) "activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . i.e.
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." 111 The Court
sidestepped the first two categories as not germane to the case and decided that
"if § 922(q) is to be sustained, it must be under the third category as a regulation
of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce." 112
In a pathbreaking discussion, the Court furthers its analysis by not only
asking whether a measure substantially affects interstate commerce, but by
considering the implication that accepting these arguments could have on the
relationship between the federal government and the states. 113 The Court
pondered several strong arguments tying guns near schools to interstate
commerce, including what the Court calls the Government's "costs of crime"
1o4115 S. Ct. at 1626.
10 5id.
10 6 Id.
10 71d.
108 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-1368 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995).
109 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1634.
110 See Stephen M. Mcjohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid
Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 24 (1995).
111 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
112Id. at 1630.
113 Mcjohn, supra note 110, at 28.
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and "national productivity" reasoning,114 but ultimately concluded that, if
accepted, these arguments would grant unlimited federal power. The Court
concluded that, "if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are
hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without
power to regulate."'115 The Lopez decision makes clear that determining whether
the regulated activity is in an area traditionally under the realm of the States is
now a part of the federal commerce power analysis.1 6 As discussed later in
this Note, this step will make it difficult for several statutes, including parts of
VAWA, to pass constitutional scrutiny.
B. Aftermath of Lopez
Prior to the decision, a noted Washington attorney claimed that, if the
Government loses, Lopez will be "perhaps the most significant constitutional
law decision of the last decade."117 The decision predictably has prompted a
flood of federal appeals on Commerce Clause grounds and considerable
discussion regarding the potential effects the decision will have on federalism
and on federal criminal law.
Nonetheless, constitutional scholars are divided over whether Lopez will
have a long-term effect on Commerce Clause jurisprudence, with some arguing
that Lopez will result in few changes and others anticipating that the decision
will spark a return to federalism. 118 Noticing that oral arguments in the case
were held on November 8, 1994, the same day Republicans won control of the
Congress, other observers claim the decision reflects approval of Congress'
vow to reduce the federal government. n 9 One scholar claims that, at the very
114Solicitor General S. Days argued the Government's case before the Court. He
maintained the law passes muster under the Commerce Clause because crime raises
insurance costs which are passed on throughout the nation, because guns in schools
reduce educational achievement which ultimately results in a reduction in our nation's
productivity and ability to compete worldwide. Harvey Berkman, Supreme Court
Heading For The Home Stretch: Commerce Clause Reaches Limit In Gun Zone Ruling, NAT'L
L. J., May 8, 1995, at A14.
115115 S. Ct. at 1632
116Mcjohn, supra note 110, at 30. Mcjohn claims that Lopez implicitly extends the
approach of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992), which holds that in
determining the extent of commerce power, the court must consider the extend of
powers reserved to the states.
117Harvey Berkman, Congress' Reach May Be Nipped: Scope of Commerce Clause Is At
Issue In Gun-Free School Zone Law, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 21, 1994, at A6 (quoting Richard K.
Willard, head of the litigation department at the Washington D.C. law firm Steptoe &
Johnson).
118Compare Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643 (1996)
with Stephen M. Mcjohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce
Clause, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1995).
119 See Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional
Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845 (1996).
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least, Lopez will result in substantial litigation costs in an effort to figure out
"what Lopez means.' 120
Despite this inconclusive debate, federal lawmakers have taken notice of the
decision and are looking more closely at ties between legislation and interstate
commerce. In addition to the quick legislative attempt to correct the Gun-Free
School Zone Act, 121 Lawmakers have mentioned the decision in 1995 debate
over the balanced budget 122 and federal tort reform.123
Prior to Lopez, the courts' approach to Commerce Clause jurisprudence was
considered "carte blanche for federal intrusion of the traditional jurisdictional
realm of the states."124 The Commerce Clause gives Congress power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes."125 For about a hundred years after the Court first
defined the nature of the clause in 1824,126 its decisions used the Commerce
Clause to strike down state legislation that "discriminated against interstate
commerce. "
12 7
Though the Court first read the Clause narrowly, this interpretation changed
after the New Deal. The Court names NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 128 Wickard
v. Filburn,129 and United States v. Darby130 as ushering in "an era of Commerce
120Judge Louis H. Pollak, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533,
551 (December 1995).
12 1 See infra p.25.
12 2
"In United States versus Lopez, the Court reaffirmed the belief that the powers of
the Federal Government have proscribed limits. Now, it is the opportunity of this
Congress to recreate the dual sovereignty that the Framers envisioned. For in the tension
between Federal and State power lies the promise of liberty.' 141 CONG. REC. S6135-36
(daily ed. May 4, 1995)(statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
123141 CONG. REC. S6033 (daily ed. May 3, 1995).
124 Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief The Federalization of American Criminal Law,
46 HASTINGs L.J. 1135, 1171 (1995) (quoting George Danzig Levine, The Proposed New
Federal Criminal Code: A Constitutional and Jurisdictional Analysis, 39 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 64
(1972)).
125U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
12 6Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 189, 190 (1824). Commerce power is: "the power to
regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power,
like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution."
Id. at 196.
127 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (upholding state
ban on manufacture of intoxicating liquor).
128301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act upon a Commerce
Clause challenge).
129317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding application of Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938
to production of homegrown wheat).
130312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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Clause jurisprudence that greatly expended the previously defined authority
of Congress under that Clause." 13 1 Observers describe modem Commerce
Clause interpretation as permission for Congress to regulate activities that
occur "entirely intrastate" but which "in the aggregate" could affect the national
economy.132
Under the previously broad interpretation of commerce power, matrimonial
law could "easily be encompassed under federal law, since most marriages use
products, or at least, affect interstate commerce."133 In fact, one jurist has
mockingly speculated that, under the old interpretation of Commerce Clause
power, the O.J. Simpson case could have easily been transferred to federal court
since the knife used to commit the crime could be loosely tied to interstate
commerce or if the celebrated Bronco chase134 crossed state lines. 135
C. Judicial Response to Lopez
No additional statutes yet have been invalidated and few cases have been
overturned on post-Lopez Commerce Clause grounds, despite dozens of initial
appeals. Most of these appeals involve weapons136 and drugl 37 convictions,
although other areas of federal criminal law are also being challenged. 138 The
overwhelming number of criminal convictions appealed after Lopez have been
131115 S. Ct. at 1628.
132Harvey Berkman, Congress' Reach May Be Nipped: Scope of Commerce Clause Is At
Issue In Gun-Free School Zone Law, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 21, 1994, at A6.
133The Honorable Robert E. Cowan, Federalization of State Law Questions: Upheaval
Ahead, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1371, 1384 (1995).
134 After initially agreeing to turn himself in to authorities after being charged in the
double murder, Simpson allegedly fled with longtime friend A.C. Cowlings in a
dramatic chase along Southern California freeways that eventually ended with his arrest
at his Brentwood estate. Jim Newton & Shawn Hubler, Simpson Flees Murder Charges;
He Disappears After Agreeing to Surrender Crime: Authorities Charge the Former Football
Star in the Slayings of his Ex-wife and her Friend, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1994, at Al.
1351d.
136 See U.S. v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294 (1995) (affirmed conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) - possession of a firearm by a felon); United States v. Diaz-Martinez; 71 F.3d 946
(1995) (affirmed conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (k); United States v. Bell, 70 F.2d 495
(7th Cir. 1995) (affirmed conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (g) (possession of a firearm by
a felon)); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirmed conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 922(o) (possession of machine gun)).
13 7See United States v. Baucum, 66 F.3d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(affirmed conviction under
21 U.S.C. § 860(a) - selling cocaine within 1,000 yards of a school, the so-called
"schoolyard statute"); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirmed
conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (aiding and abetting the manufacture of marijuana)).
13 8See Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995) (conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 248
- Freedom of Access to Clinics Act); United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.
1995)(conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (a) - conspiracy to commit extortion).
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affirmed. Courts have, however, issued some notable decisions in which Lopez
has been used to overturn decisions on Commerce Clause grounds.
In United States v. Pappadopoulos,139 the Ninth Circuit overturned a conviction
under the federal arson statute,140 finding that the fact that the residence in
question received natural gas from an out-of-state source was an insufficient
tie to interstate commerce.141 The Government also failed the traditional realm
of the states portion of the Lopez test. The court concluded that "[t]his is a simple
state arson crime. It should have been tried in state court. "142 Some feel,
however, that the Pappadopoulos court misinterpreted the Lopez decision and
predict that the decision will be overturned upon appeal to the Supreme
Court. 143 Still, in late 1995, the Eleventh Circuit also reversed a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 844 (i), finding that the arson in question did not have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 144
A divided Third Circuit decision offers additional evidence that Lopez will
continue to send shockwaves throughout our legal system. In United States v.
Bishop,145 the defendant challenged his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2119, the
federal carjacking statute,146 arguing, per Lopez, that Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority in enacting the law. Although the conviction was
affirmed, a strong dissent argued that, under Lopez, the statute cannot
withstand constitutional challenge. 147 Dissenting Justice Becker stated that "I
view Lopez as a beacon that we must follow, and the direction in which the
beacon points compels my vote to invalidate the carjacking statute as beyond
the broad reach of Congress's Commerce Clause power."'14 8 Justice Becker
boldly concluded that he believed that non-commercial intrastate crimes, even
ones receiving publicity in the national media, are a matter of state and not
13964 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995).
14018 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1988).
14164 F.3d at 527.
14 2 1d. at 528.
143Jesse H. Choper, Remarks at Symposium on The New Federalism After United
States v. Lopez (Nov. 10, 1995) (videotape on file at the Case Western Reserve Law
School library).
144 United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328 (1996).
14566 F.3d 569 (1995).
14618 U.S.C. § 2119 provides that: "Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in
section 921 of this title, takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped or
received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by
force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned."
147 Bishop, 66 F.3d at 590 (Becker, J., dissenting).
1481d. at 591.
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federal concern." 149 Court observers, however, point to recent denials of
certiorari in post-Lopez cases as proof that the Supreme Court may not be
interested in further strengthening its limits on Congress' Commerce Clause
power.150 The Court apparently is willing to let stand a Fourth Circuit
conviction under the federal arson statute in which the court concluded that
receipt of electricity from interstate power grid is a sufficient tie to interstate
commerce. 15 1 Interestingly, Justice Scalia said he would grant the petition and
"remand the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
for further consideration in light of United States v. Lopez."'152
IV. APPLICATION: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE VAWA
Sections 2261, the interstate travel provision, and 13981, the civil rights
provision, of the VAWA would most likely fail the new Lopez test for
determining if the measure falls within Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause. Neither provision substantially affects interstate commerce and, more
importantly, both involve an area of concern traditionally left to the states:
domestic relations.
A. Congress' Understanding of the Scope of the Commerce Clause
Perhaps the strongest argument for overturning portions of the VAWA is the
legislative reliance on the outdated interpretation of Congress' Commerce
Clause power. In fact the civil rights provision [hereinafter title III or § 13981]
is expressly premised upon Congress' Commerce Clause power. Significantly,
Justice Breyer's Lopez dissent voices concern over the effect the decision could
have on the 100 federal statutes, including at least 25 criminal provisions, that
use the term "affecting commerce" in defining their scope.153
Lawmakers studying the civil rights remedy provided, in a Senate Report,154
an in-depth analysis of the provision '"because many questions have been raised
regarding title III. '155 In hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
1491d. at 603
15 0Kathleen Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 801 (1996).
151 United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995).
The defendants were convicted of committing arson under 18 U.S.C. § 844 after setting
fire to the trailer of an interracial couple.
152 See 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995).
153115 S. Ct. at 1164 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer concludes, "[h]owever these
questions are eventually resolved, the legal uncertainty now created will restrict
Congress' ability to enact criminal laws aimed at criminal behavior that, considered
problem by problem rather than instance by instance, seriously threatens the economic,
as well as social, well-being of Americans." Id. at 1165.
154S. Rep. No. 103-138 at 48.
155 Id.
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scholars concluded, because title III is based on the Commerce Clause, "the
constitutional objections to the bill are quite weak."156 The Senate Report
further states that federal lawmakers need only have a "rational basis" for
creating a law because the "Commerce Clause is a broad grant of power
allowing Congress to reach conduct that has even the slightest effect on
interstate commerce."157 Congress can pass a law even if it "does not directly
effect 'commerce"' and may even reach conduct "that may seem purely local in
nature."158
In meeting this "modest threshold," the Report offers general evidence tying
the provision to interstate commerce. It claims gender-based crime "restricts
movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures,
and reduces consumer spending."159 In coming to these conclusions,
lawmakers offered studies on women and rape160 and reports on how
gender-based violence affects women in the workforce, 161 but no strong figures
or other evidence tying gender-based violence to interstate commerce. While
this proof allowed the provision to pass constitutional muster under the
pre-Lopez standard for determining Congress' Commerce Clause authority, it
is inadequate under the new Lopez standard. It is doubtful whether either
VAWA provision in question could meet this new test.
Disagreement exists, however, over whether Lopez actually overruled the
rational basis test for determining Congress' limits under the Commerce
Clause. The Doe court, in denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint under the VAWA civil rights provision, concluded that Lopez
reaffirmed the rationality test of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
156 See Women and Violence: Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (Apr. 9, 1991). Professors Cass Sunstein of the University of Chicago School of
Law and Burt Neuborne of the New York University School of Law testified that
Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to enact such a civil rights remedy
for victims of gender-motivated crime. Interestingly, Professor Neubome, in an article
discussing the 1994 Supreme Court term, claims, "[a]n early indicator of the impact of
Lopez may come in cases challenging the constitutionality of the Violence Against
Women Act, which was premised in part on Congress' Commerce Clause power." Burt
Neuborne, Significant Constitutional Opinions: 1994 Term in COMMUNICATIONs LAW:
1995, (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. 989, (1995)).
157S. Rep. No. 103-138 at 54.
15 81d.
159Id.
160 See E. Ellis, B. Atkeson, and K. Calhoun, An Assessment of Long-Term Reaction to
Rape, 90 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY No. 3,264 (1981) (concluding that 50 percent of rape
victims lose or quit their jobs following the crime).
16 1See 39 MoRBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY., 544 (1990)(claiming that fear of attack deters
women from taking certain jobs or positions that would require them to work certain
hours).
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Ass'n Inc..162 The Doe court acknowledged that Lopez "does warn that the
Commerce Clause has limits, and that 'the scope of the interstate commerce
power, must be considered in light of our duel system of government and may
not be extended as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and
remote."' 163 The Doe court, however, maintained that the rational basis test
remains the proper measure of Congress' Commerce Clause power. The court
decided that, "[a] rational basis exists for concluding that gender-based
violence, which the VAWA's Civil Rights Remedy regulates, is a national
problem with substantial impact on interstate commerce." 164 This Note
maintains that the new "substantial effects" test set forth in Lopez replaced the
rational basis test for determining Congress' Commerce Clause power and,
unlike Doe, contends that, in most cases, domestic violence does not have the
requisite tie to interstate commerce necessary to justify federal intervention.
B. No Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
Using the analysis of the Lopez court, both VAWA provisions would have to
be studied under the "substantially effects" test, since neither involve channels
nor instramentalities of interstate commerce, the other methods, according to
the Court, by which Congress can regulate activity. While it could be argued
that all persons could be considered "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce,
accepting this argument would open all activity to federal control with little
analysis.
Like the Government in Lopez, proponents of VAWA would likely fail the
"substantial effects" test if presented with a Commerce Clause challenge. The
Court in Lopez rejected both the "cost of crime" and "national productivity"
arguments offered by the Government to show that guns near schools affect
interstate commerce. The Government claimed that the possession of firearms
in school zones could increase the costs of violent crime which, through
insurance, are spread throughout the population.165 The Government further
argued that the presence of guns in schools has an adverse affect on the
educational process, which could lead to a "less productive citizenry."166
Lawmakers have set forth similar arguments to justify congressional
intrusion into the area of domestic relations through the VAWA's civil rights
remedy.167 Had Congress felt the need to show how VAWA's criminal provision
162452 U.S. 264 (1981). Hodel maintains that, in reviewing the constitutionality of a
statute under the Commerce Clause, a court is limited to "whether a rational basis existed
for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce." Doe,
929 F. Supp. at 612.
163 Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613 (quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628).
164 d. at 610.
165115 S. Ct. at 1632.
166Id.
167See infra pp. 18-19.
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was tied to interstate commerce, it would have used reasoning similar to the
"cost of crime" and "national productivity" arguments used by the Government
in Lopez. Since 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) was struck down using analogous arguments,
the Court most likely would not accept this same reasoning in a VAWA
challenge.
The Court in Lopez suggested that more formal legislative findings could
have provided a link between gun possession in school zones and interstate
commerce. 168 Under the rational basis test previously used in Commerce
Clause analysis, however, Congress is not required to "articulate its reasons for
enacting a statute."169 Although the Court in Lopez acknowledged this fact, the
Court observed that, where the relationship between the activity and interstate
commerce is not obvious, legislative findings may assist in evaluating the
congressional judgment that a substantial relationship exists. 170 The
Government in Lopez argued that Congress had included specific findings in
firearms legislation on prior occasions, but the Court concluded that reliance
on previous findings would be inappropriate in the context of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act because "neither the findings nor the laws they support
address gun possession in school zones or the relationship between that
activity and commerce." 171
Comparatively, the VAWA would have passed the pre-Lopez rational basis
test but would fail the new "substantial effects" analysis requiring legislative
findings linking an activity to interstate commerce. Though the Act's legislative
history, as discussed, provides evidence indicating a tenuous tie between
domestic violence and interstate commerce, the Act itself admits that the true
effects of domestic violence on the national economy may be unknown.172 A
minor provision of the VAWA requires a study by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, among other things, to project the cost to health care facilities
from incidents of domestic abuse. 173 Since lawmakers enacting the VAWA
concede, by the inclusion of this provision, that the economic effects of
168 Brickey, supra note 150, at 822.
169 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (1993).
170115 S. Ct. 1624 at 1632.
171Brickey, supra note 150, at 825.
172 See supra pp. 22-23.
173 See 42 U.S.C.A § 13963 (West 1995) (previously Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40293 (1994)),
titled Number and Cost of Injuries:
(a) STUDY.-The Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting
through the Centers for Disease Control Injury Division, shall
conduct a study to obtain a national projection of the incidence of
injuries resulting from domestic violence, the cost of injuries to health
care facilities, and recommend health care strategies for reducing the
incidence and costs of such injuries.
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.- There are author-
ized to be appropriate to carry out this section -$100,000 for fiscal
year 1996.
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domestic violence are, for the most part, unknown, it is unlikely that additional
legislative history could be offered that would provide a link between domestic
violence and interstate commerce strong enough to withstand a Lopez
challenge.
After studying the legislative history of the VAWA civil rights provision, the
Brzonkala court determined that the statute fails the Lopez substantial effects
test. In comparing the VAWA civil rights remedy with the statute at issue in
Lopez, the court concluded that "[t]he bottom line is that both Lopez and the
case at hand involve regulated activity that is too remote from interstate
commerce. Any substantial distinction between the lengths of the chains of
causation in Lopez and the lengths of the chains in the case at hand is
inconsequential."174
The Doe court, however, found that the Act's legislative history does provide
an adequate link between domestic violence and interstate commerce. The
defense maintained, as does this Note, that Lopez is critical of the same "cost of
crime" and "national productivity" arguments relied upon in enacting the
VAWA. 175 The Doe court rejected this argument as 'based upon 'selectively
relying on Supreme Court statements plucked from their context."' 17 6 Doe
further argues that "[t]he Congressional findings and reports qualitatively and
quantitatively demonstrate the substantial effect on interstate commerce of
gender-based violence, in marked distinction to the Gun-Free Zone Act
challenged in Lopez which lacked such analysis, only theoretical impact
arguments."177
Furthermore, similar to the Gun-Free School Zone Act, the VAWA is not an
"essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity" that could tie the law
to interstate commerce if considered with a larger regulatory scheme. The
Court in Lopez states that the gun law could be considered constitutional if
associated with an aggregate of activities "that arise out of or are connected
with a commercial transaction, which views in the aggregate, substantially
affects interstate commerce." 178 The VAWA likewise has no ties to such
commercial activities. The VAWA is part of a larger regulatory scheme: the 1994
Crime Bill. The only arguments, however, that could tie the entire Bill to
commercial activity would be those resoundingly rejected by the Lopez court.
The Lopez decision creates additional confusion by failing to clarify the terms
"commerce" and "economic enterprise." The Court concluded that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act has "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
174 Brzonkala, 979 F. Supp. at 791.
175 Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613.
176 d. (quoting U.S. v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (11th Cir. 1995)).
177 d.
178115 S. Ct. at 1631.
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enterprises, however broadly one might define those terms."179 The Court,
however, offers no definition of commercial or economic activity, but concedes
that no precise formula exists for determining what is commercial or
noncommercial. 180 Notably, this lack of definition allowed the Doe court to find
that gender-based violence has a substantial effect on commerce. The court
points out that "Supreme Court precedent does not articulate a particular
standard or test to determine whether a particular activity 'substantially
affects' interstate commerce."181 The Doe court, thus, took advantage of the
Lopez conclusion that "whether a particular activity substantially affects
commerce is 'ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question.""'182
C. No Jurisdictional Element
A jurisdictional requirement in a federal statute requires a tie to interstate
commerce on a case-by-case basis. Scholars suggest that crossing a state line,
as required by the VAWA's criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2261, automatically
invokes Congress' Commerce Clause power.18 3 Thus, in the VAWA's criminal
provision, the jurisdictional element is always invoked by requiring that a
perpetrator cross state lines when committing an act of domestic violence.
Other statutes require a prosecutor to prove that the individual case is linked
to interstate commerce. 184
A notable similarity between the VAWA civil rights provision and the statute
at issue in Lopez is the absence of a jurisdictional element. The inclusion of such
an element would require prosecutors to evaluate the ties to interstate
commerce in individual cases. The inclusion of a jurisdictional element in the
federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 844(i), explains why an arson conviction
was overturned in Pappadopoulos but affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Sherlin.185 The Sherlin court determined that the college dormitory
involved in the crime provided an adequate tie to interstate commerce, 186 while
the Pappadopoulos court found an insufficient tie to commerce. If a jurisdictional
179115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
180115 S. Ct. at 1163-64.
181 Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614.
182 1d. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629).
183 Brickey, supra note 150, at 812.
184 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 844(i) (West 1995), the federal arson statute:
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or
destroys, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or
other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or
in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned
for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000 or both.
Id. (emphasis added).
18567 F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995).
18 6Id.
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element were present in Lopez, the case could have been overturned without
invalidation of the statute.
The addition of a jurisdictional element could, perhaps, allow some VAWA
civil rights cases to pass the substantial effects test without invalidating that
portion of the Act. For example, attorneys in Brzonkala could have, using the
logic of Sherlin, argued that, because the alleged rape took place on a college
campus, there was a proper tie to interstate commerce. In fact, a Justice
Department attorney arguing for the plaintiffs before the federal judge in
Roanoke on the motion to dismiss the case pointed out that the number one
reason college freshman drop out of school is because they were raped.
187
While the Brzonkala court did not discuss whether the individual case
involved an adequate tie to interstate commerce, it did note the lack of a
jurisdictional element. Although the court determined that "it is unclear
whether such a jurisdictional requirement is needed,' 18 8 it concluded that
"ambiguity in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity ... and
that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of not significantly changing the
federal-state balance."189
The crossing of state lines required to invoke the VAWA criminal provision
was, in the past, enough to invoke federal jurisdiction. Congress traditionally
used this interstate transportation method to impose federal jurisdiction over
many areas ordinarily considered local, such as kidnapping,190 prostitution,191
and child pornography.192 Until Lopez, the Court repeatedly validated this
approach.193 Nonetheless, Lopez could inflict doubt on this method. A crime
that involves the crossing of state lines may not have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Similar to Alphonso Lopez, Christopher Bailey is a local
actor. Crossing a state line when committing domestic abuse did not magically
transform his crime from a noncommercial to a commercial activity or from a
noneconomic to an economic activity. The Lopez logic demands that this
well-established method of invoking federal jurisdiction be reconsidered as
courts re-examine Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
187Jan Vertefeuille, Big Guns Square Off in Lawsuit; D.C. Firm, Justice Dept. Hold Forth
on Brzonkala, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, June 11, 1996, at C1.
188Brzonkala, 779 F. Supp. at 792.
1891d. (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 349 (1971)).
19018 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West 1995) (transporting kidnapping victim over state lines).
19118 U.S.C.A. § 2421-2423 (West 1995) (transporting an individual over state lines to
engage in prostitution).
19218 U.S.C.A. § 2251 (West 1995) (transporting a minor across state line to engage in
sexually explicit conduct for visual depiction).
193 See, e.g., Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 227 U.S. 309 (1913) (upholding federal
statute prohibiting interstate transportation of adulterated articles); Reid v. Colorado,
187 U.S. 137 (1902) (upholding federal statute prohibiting the interstate transport of
diseased livestock).
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In discussing the federal carjacking statute, which also lacks a jurisdictional
element, the Bishop majority admits that, "[tihe mere presence of a jurisdictional
element does not in and of itself insulate a statute from judicial scrutiny under
the Commerce Clause, or render it per se constitutional. Conversely, the courts
must inquire further to determine whether the jurisdictional element has the
requisite nexus with interstate commerce.'"94 The courts could therefore find
cases under 18 U.S.C. § 2261 unconstitutional despite the presence of a
jurisdictional element. Scholars have already labeled 18 U.S.C. § 2261's
jurisdictional element "marginally relevant" in urging Congress to avoid
bringing "matters of primarily local interest into the local sphere" by this type
of statutory construction. 195
Since the Lopez decision arguably is merely the result of inadequate statutory
construction, lawmakers accordingly felt that changing statutory language by
adding a jurisdictional element would fix the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 and conveniently allow the measure to fall under Congress' Commerce
Clause powers. Approximately two weeks after Lopez was decided, United
States President William Clinton sent identical letters to both houses of
Congress urging the passage of the Gun-Free School Zones Amendments Act
of 1995.196 The sole change in the measure, recommended after the President
asked Attorney General Janet Reno to formulate a "legislative solution" to the
problems identified in the Lopez decision, is the inclusion of the jurisdictional
element which the President optimistically claims will bring the legislation
"within the Congress' Commerce Clause authority."197 The amended Act
requires the Government to show that the firearm has 'moved in or the
possession of such firearm otherwise affects interstate or foreign
commerce.'
1 98
The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1995 (S. 890) was introduced to Congress
less than a month after President Clinton issued his letter.199 Introducing the
amended bill, Wisconsin Senator Herbert Kohl stated, "there is no doubt that
the guns brought to schools are part of an interstate problem. After all, almost
every gun is made with raw material from one State, assembled in a second
State and transported to the school yard of another State."200 Kohl's argument,
however, is precisely that which the Lopez court firmly rejected. Utilizing the
194 Bishop, 667 F.3d at 585.
195Brickey, supra note 124, at 1168.
196141 CONG. REC. H4680-03, S6459-02 (daily ed. May 10, 1995). The President's letter
states that he is "committed to doing everything in my power to make schools places
where young people can be secure, where they can learn, and where parents can be
confident that discipline is enforced." Id.
197Id.
19 8Id.
199141 CONG. REC. S7918-02 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
2 0 0 Id.
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Senator's logic, almost any activity could be related to interstate commerce.
Kohl continued his speech by saying that forty states currently regulate guns
on school grounds, offering proof that the amended law is still questionable
under the portion of the Lopez analysis that asks if the regulated activity is one
which is traditionally relegated to the States.201 Likewise, the fact that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2261 includes a jurisdictional component tying the crimes to interstate
activity will not change the fact that the acts of domestic violence likely to be
charged under the law have no substantial tie to interstate commerce.
D. States' Role
Convincing a court that domestic violence is not an area of law traditionally
overseen by the States may be a tougher hurdle for the VAWA to overcome.
Domestic violence arguably combines two areas of the law mentioned by the
Court in Lopez as traditionally under state control: crime and domestic
relations. A strong argument for the invalidation of both the VAWA's interstate
criminal provision and the civil rights remedy under Lopez grounds is thus that
the statutes, like the education tie to 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), concern an area of law
traditionally left to the states.
The Lopez decision confirms that "it is well established that education is a
traditional concern of the states."202 Importantly, the decision also concedes
that domestic relations falls into this category.203 The dissenting Lopez justices
also acknowledge the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction.
While these justices disapproved of invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q), their
decision indicated that they would, perhaps, favor repealing 18 U.S.C. § 2261
based on their recognition of the domestic relations exception to diversity
jurisdiction. Justice Breyer's dissent in Lopez acknowledges that there could be
limits on Congress' Commerce Clause power in family law.
To hold this statute constitutional is not to "obliterate" the "distinction
of what is national and what is local,"; nor is it to hold that the
Commerce Clause permits the Federal Government to "regulate any
activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of
individual citizens," to regulate "marriage, divorce, and child custody,"
or to regulate any and all aspects of education.
20 4
This singling out of family law indicates that Breyer realizes the importance of
maintaining the family law exception to diversity jurisdiction.
201Id. Kohl's speech continued by acknowledging that some of his colleagues have
asked why a federal statute is necessary. Kohl says, "The answer is simple. Some States
still do not have State Gun-Free School Zones Acts; others simply have laws that
supplement the Federal statute; still more have laws that are weaker than the Federal
law." Id.
202115 S. Ct. at 1640. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2 0 3 d. at 1632.
204Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1661 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The increasing intrusion of the federal courts into the area of domestic
relations is well documented. One oberver claims that "prior to the current
Supreme Court term, one might easily have concluded that we were witnessing
the inevitable surrender of perhaps the last remaining substantive legal area
within the states' exclusive control."205
For decades, cases involving domestic relations were rarely heard in federal
courthouses. The so-called "domestic relations exception" to diversity
jurisdiction has been recognized by scholars as a court-made doctrine.206 The
exception has been traced to the 1859 case of Barber v. Barber,2 07 in which the
Court announced without justification, "[o]ur first remark is-and we wish it
to be remembered-that this is not a suit asking the court for the allowance of
alimony.... We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United
States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony."208 The
Barber dissent further argued that a government should not enter "the chambers
and nurseries of private families."209 Commentators have observed that the
dissenters by "[g]overnment," meant the federal, not state governments, and
noticed that the dissenting judges felt that the "'particular communities of
which those families form parts' could regulate families."2 10 About thirty years
later the Supreme Court reiterated this intent In Re Burrus,2 11 declaring "[t]he
whole subject to the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States."212
Since Barber, the federal courts have found exceptions to the domestic
relations exception, particularly in the area of tort and contract law. 213 In 1988,
205Dailey, supra note 12, at 1789.
2 0 6 See ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION § 5.3 (1989). Chemerinsky
mentions domestic relations and probate as exceptions to diversity jurisdiction. He
recognizes the opinions of critics who claim that is such exceptions are desired, it is more
appropriate for Congress to create them. He also suggests that is may be inappropriate
to exempt domestic relations and probate from "federal court review because they are
no more linked to core aspects of state sovereignty than are many other types of suits
that federal courts may adjudicate." Id. at 289.
20762 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
2081d. at 584.
2091d. at 602 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
2101d. See Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L.
REV. 1073, 1077 n.17 (1994).
211136 U.S. 586 (1890).
2121d. at 593-94.
213See Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985)(holding that, in case in which
former husband sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress by wife
after wife allegedly attempted to destroy father-son relationship, diversity jurisdiction
over such an action did not contravene domestic relations exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction); Turpin v. Turpin, 415 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Okla. 1975)(holding that where
the complaint involved both an "alleged contractual wrong and alleged tortious wrong,
neither of which appeared to arise out of the parties' former marital relationship, the
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the Court reaffirmed the exception in Thompson v. Thompson214 and invalidated
the Parental Kidnapping Act. In 1992, the Supreme Court again upheld the
exception, but narrowed its scope considerably. In Ankenbrandt v. Richards,
2 15
a unanimous Court concluded that the exception encompasses only cases
involving the issuance of divorce, alimony or child custody decrees, 216 but
reasoned that the exception is a matter of statutory, as opposed to
constitutional, construction. 217 Writing for the majority, Justice Byron White
decided that, "the exception has no place in a suit such as this one, in which a
former spouse sues another on behalf of children alleged to have been
abused."218
Legal observers immediately speculated that the decision could ease the way
for Congress to pass the then-pending VAWA.219 Proponentsof the Act could
easily argue that by excluding domestic violence from the areas specifically
mentioned as remaining with the domestic relations exception, the Court
leaves open the possibility of federal jurisdiction over domestic violence. A
VAWA challenge could spark a judicial debate over the difference between
domestic relations and domestic violence and whether classifying domestic
abuse as a separate area of criminal activity is beneficial or detrimental to its
control. Lawmakers considering passage of the VAWA found that labeling
abuse against women "domestic violence," lessened its severity and furthered
its perception as a "family" problem or "private matter." A Senate report
concludes that, "[a]nd until we name all violence against women as crime, it
will be seen neither as violence nor as crime."220
Even if the Court finds that domestic violence differs from domestic
relations, the Lopez decision recognizes that crime is an area of law traditionally
reserved to the states. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 governs criminal activity. Justice
Rehnquist's opinion recognizes crime as an area of traditional state concern
saying, "[ulnder the theories that the Government presents in support of 18
action was not primarily a marital dispute and the federal court had subject matter
jurisdiction").
214484 U.S. 174 (1988).
215504 U.S. 689 (1992). The case involves a Missouri mother who sued her former
husband and a companion in federal court in Louisiana for damages resulted from
alleged sexual abuse of her daughters.
216504 U.S. at 704.
217504 U.S. at 695 (finding that Article III, § 2 of the Constitution does not exclude
domestic relations cases from "the jurisdiction otherwise granted by statute to the federal
courts.")
21 81d. at 706.
219 Professor Linda Mullenix of the University of Texas School of Law called the
decision an "'open invitation' to Congress to create by statute a basis for federal
jurisdiction in domestic relations disputes." See Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Court
Affirms Family Exception, Narrowly, NAT'L L.J., June 29, 1992, at 5.
220S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 37 (1991).
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U.S.C. § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even
in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States have
historically been sovereign."221 Justice Kennedy furthers that, when dealing
with crime, the States should be allowed to "perform their role as laboratories
for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far
from clear."222
The states as "laboratories for experimentation" is a better environment than
the federal courts for discovering solutions to the problem of domestic violence.
Similar to education, issues surrounding domestic violence vary from state to
state. The states have continuously been developing various ways to deal with
the problem of domestic violence based on their respective experiences with
the problem. This experimentation should not be halted by federal intrusion.
Justice Kennedy's Lopez concurrence points out that more than forty states
already have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near
school grounds.223 Likewise, the states have already developed a long history
of enacting laws in response to domestic violence. At least twenty-seven states
mandate arrest on domestic violence cases in which there is clear evidence of
a crime. 224 Over the past three years, at least forty-one states have passed
stalking laws that allow police to arrest an ex-spouse or partner for threatening
or harassing a victim. Previously officers could not do anything unless a victim
was physically attacked.22 5
In the year following the Simpson and Goldman murders several states
made significant changes in domestic violence legislation. California
lawmakers say the Simpson case was a primary influence in their reform
efforts. As of January 1, 1996, first-time batterers were unable to escape criminal
prosecution by agreeing to undergo counseling, a tactic attempted by O.J.
Simpson in a 1989 attack on his wife.22 6 This bill, signed into law by Governor
Pete Wilson in October 1995, eliminates the "diversion" process instituted in
1979, which allowed those accused of domestic abuse to avoid criminal
prosecution by agreeing to undergo counseling.227 Bill sponsor, Rep. Tom
Hayden (D-Santa Monica), said the gruesome pictures of Nicole Brown
221115 S. Ct. at 1632.
2221d. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22 31d.
224Gest & Streisand, supra note 22.
22 5Andrea Rock, Unequal Justice: Women Have Won Many Important Legal Victories, But
We Still Have A Long Way To Go, LADIES HOME JOURNAL, Apr. 1995, at 106.
22 6Bill Stall, Law Stiffened For First-Time Wife Beaters, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1995, at 3.
Simpson's lawyers asked a judge to allow Simpson to undergo counseling so he could
emerge without a criminal record, but the request was denied. Had the request been
granted, there would have been no court record of the assault.
2 2 7 1d.
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Simpson, shown at Simpson's double murder trial, were "motivating factors"
in passage of the new law.22 8
On June 23, 1994, the New York legislature unanimously passed a
multifaceted plan 22 9 to fight domestic violence by requiring the arrest of
batterers who commit a felony assault or violate protection orders and by
requiring training of police and prosecutors in dealing with domestic
violence. 230 Colorado currently has one of the country's toughest set of
domestic violence laws, requiring arrest for a first violation of a restraining
order and mandatory jail time for subsequent violations. 23 1 As a result,
domestic violence arrests in that state have climbed 70 percent in three years. 2
32
Also in 1995, the Texas legislature eliminated the so-called "spousal privilege"
in its domestic violence law, a change observers claim is the result of the
publicity surrounding the Simpson case. 23 3 In its 1995 legislative session,
Oregon authorized restraining orders against stalkers and passed a measure
that fines those found guilty of domestic violence $500 to $2,000.234 Many states
put tougher laws on the books even before the Simpson case in response to
strong local publicity. In 1992, the Kentucky legislature enacted more stringent
domestic violence measures in response to a Pulitzer Prize-winning series of
editorials by a Kentucky newspaper.235 Officials claim that the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges now look to Kentucky for
assistance in developing a model code.236
Similar to the VAWA, many of these state laws had been pending for years.
State lawmakers claim that the Simpson case "created a climate that compelled
lawmakers to approve them."23 7 This catalistic effect is obviously true for
federal lawmakers who were not only feeling political pressure to pass the
VAWA, but the entire 1994 Crime Bill out of a fear of appearing soft on crime.
2281d. See California Senate Bill 169. See also California Assembly Bill 1937, which
prohibits insurance companies from denying or restricting coverage from victims of
domestic abuse and California Senate Bill 924, which extends from one to three years
the period in which abuse victims can file civil suits in those cases.
229N.Y. ExEc. LAw Article 21, § 575 (West 1996).
230Rorie Sherman, Domestic Abuse Bills Gain Momentum in Legislatures; The Violence
Against Women Act Has Lingered on the Hill for Four Years, NAT'L L.J., July 4, 1994, at A9.
231Jill Smolowe, When Violence Hits Home, TIME, July 4, 1994, at 18.
232Gest & Streisand, supra note 22.
233 Helen Thorpe, Fighting Back, TEXAS MONTHLY, Dec. 1995, at 22. See also OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.730 et. seq (1995).
234Chastity Pratt, Aid Calls Rise in Wake of Simpson Acquittal, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Oct. 16, 1995, at B1.
235 Robert H. Campbell & Valarie Honeycutt, Enforcement of Strict Spouse Abuse Laws
Uneven in California, As in Kentucky, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 21, 1994, at Al.
236sd.
237pratt, supra note 232, at B1.
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This national publicity will likely make these previously ineffective state
measures more viable, further lessening the need for federal action. Since the
state legislatures, like Congress, have responded to the outrage generated by
the Simpson case, these "laboratories for experimentation" are actively
pursuing solutions to the domestic violence problems.
The Doe court also acknowledged the argument that the VAWA encroaches
on states' police power. The court, however, claims that the VAWA civil rights
remedy "does nothing to infringe on a state's authority to arrest and prosecute
an alleged batterer on applicable criminal charges."238 The court further
concludes that the VAWA actually complements state law by providing a
remedy distinct from state tort claims and that "[a] plaintiff who obtains relief
in a civil rights lawsuit 'does so not for himself [or herself] alone but also as a
private attorney general vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
highest importance.'" 239
Ideally, the portions of the VAWA which provide money to the states240 to
continue their efforts should remain, while the criminal and civil rights
provisions should be invalidated on Commerce Clause grounds. Judge Robert
E. Cowen of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals suggests that, through
innovative use of Congress' spending power,24 1 the deterrent goals of the
VAWA could be maintained. Judge Cowen proposes that the federal
government could require the states to "provide adequate penalties or certain
infractions and crimes" by providing funds on the condition that the states
impose certain uniform regulations" as is done in traffic and driver licensing.24 2
This cooperation "achieves the end result of federalization without the pain of
having to federalize all traffic regulations and overwhelming the federal courts
with traffic violation cases. '243
238 Doe, 929 F. Supp. 616.
2391d. (quoting City of Riverdale v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986)).
240 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A., § 37 96gg (West 1995):
(a) General Program Purpose.-The purpose of this part is to assist
States, Indian tribal government, and units of local government to
develop and strengthen effective law enforcement and prosecution
strategies to combat violent crimes against women, and to develop
and strengthen victim services in cases involving violent crimes
against women.
(b) Purposes For Which Grants May Be Used.-Grants under this
part shall provide personnel, training, technical assistance, data
collection and other equipment for the more widespread appre-
hension, prosecution, and adjudication of persons committing
violent crimes against women.
2 4 1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
242 The Honorable Robert E. Cowen, Federalization of State Law Questions: Upheaval
Ahead, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 1371, 1371 (1995).
243Id.
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E. VAWA & Federalism
Justice Kennedy concedes that no reasonable person would argue that
students should not carry guns on school property.244 Likewise, no reasonable
person will argue that citizens should not be concerned with the problem of
domestic violence in our country. Kennedy's interest, however, is that
Congress' method of solving this and other problems interferes with the
balance of powers between the states and the federal government as set forth
in the Tenth Amendment. 245 He asserts,
[w]hile the intrusion on state sovereignty may not be as severe in this
instance as in some of our recent Tenth Amendment cases, the intrusion
is nonetheless significant. Absent a stronger connection or
identification with commercial concerns that are central to the
Commerce Clause, that interference contradicts the federal balance the
Framers designed and that this Court is obligated to enforce.
246
Maintaining this balance adds strength to the argument that Congress
exceeded its authority in enacting the VAWA as scholars have observed that
Federalist theory requires that, "federal courts should exercise only limited
jurisdiction, deferring to the strong (and equal) state courts, which traditionally
have controlled and developed expertise in family law."24 7
This change in the balance between the states and federal government
appears to be escalating. Congress has created 202 new laws in the last twenty
years.248 The 1994 Crime Bill added more than 100 new federal criminal
provisions. 249 Federalization of criminal law is dramatically increasing the
workload of federal courts, so much so that one jurist calls this increase "the
most pressing concern for the federal judiciary."250 This "creeping federalism"
was considered the "hottest issue" at the 1995 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
annual judicial conference. 251 Panelist Representative and vice chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee Don Edwards told attendees of judges' displeasure
with new laws putting carjacking, collection of child support, as well as
244115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
245
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
246115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
247 Naomi Cahn, Family Law, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073,
1073-74 (1994).
248William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719
(1995).
2491d. (citing Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796).
250Cowan, supra note 242, at 1371.
251Victoria Slind-Flor, 9th Circuit's Theme: Federalism, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at 3.
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domestic violence within the federal courts' jurisdiction. Edwards claims that
"without a halt to such jurisdictional expansion, federal judges would be
reduced to the level of justices of the peace."252 Speaking at the same
conference, Attorney General Janet Reno told participants, in an obvious
reference to the Lopez case, that she would "discourage policies that encourage
U.S. attorneys to take an 18-year-old . . . into federal court just to get
headlines."253 Others warn,
[a]s long as the rhetoric is maintained that the most important
problems facing this society should be nationalized, and as long as the
economics of public choice is such that it is easier to promote
substantive policies at the federal rather than at the state level, the push
for federalization is not likely to subside.
254
Judge Kiser reiterated this theme in Brzonkala by stating that,
[wjithout a doubt violence against women is a pervasive and
troublesome aspect of American life which needs thoughtful attention.
But Congress is not invested with the authority to cure all of the ills of
mankind. Its authority to act is limited by the Constitution, and the
constitutional limits must be respected if our federal system is to
survive.
255
Domestic violence is a serious problem. In creating solutions to this crisis,
federal lawmakers unfortunately have failed to consider values such as
federalism which are deeply embedded in our system of government.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent judiciary and media events have put a national focus on the
overlooked problem of domestic violence. Federal lawmakers admirably
responded to this attention in an aggressive manner. While effective resolution
of this problem is necessary, the hasty response by federal lawmakers is
unconstitutional in consideration of the Supreme Court's recent holding in
Lopez. This decision breaks with the Court's traditional interpretation of
Congress' Commerce Clause power to enact federal legislation. Under Lopez,
Congress may have overstepped its authority granted by the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution in enacting legislation which federalizes offenses by
crossing a state line when committing domestic violence and by creating a civil
rights remedy in domestic abuse cases. Although intial court challenges to the
VAWA on Lopez grounds have resulted in split decisions, both the civil rights
and criminal measures are likely to be invalidated upon further challenge. This
2521d. at 32.
2531d.
254William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overviezv, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 737
(1995).
255 Brzonkala, 779 F. Supp. at 801.
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invalidation, however, would not defeat those battling this national problem.
A challenge to this law would properly put the responsibility for finding
solutions for the problems of domestic violence fully in the hands of the states
and allow these "laboratories for experimentation" to continue in their efforts
to find viable and individualized solutions to what is primarily a local problem.
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